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Equity Joint Ventures with the People's
Republic of China: A Puzzle in Politics,
Law, and Tradition
By ALISON LISA PATRUCCO*
Research Associate in Law, University of Florida; B.A. 1978,
University of Florida; JD. 1985, University of Florida.
I. INTRODUCTrION
Attracting foreign investment through equity joint ventures has be-
come a priority of the People's Republic of China (China). Western in-
vestors responded with cautious interest during the evolution of joint
venture policy from 1979 to 1986. Some investors praise China's west-
ernization in policy and goals, while others note high costs and low re-
turns. Little comparative information on joint venture productivity
exists, however, because most venture contracts have been signed since
1984.1
Available information on the productivity of joint ventures in China
needs review and analysis for two reasons. First, businesses in record
numbers are signing venture contracts despite the unmeasured risks.2
Some ventures may face failure from management mistakes and political
blunders that investors could have predicted by using the experiences
now available as guides. Second, current joint venturers are tiring of
China's practical and policy-based impediments to venture production
and profits. Some investors are threatening to pull out, and the first de-
fection may prompt a wave of withdrawals.3
* The author gratefully acknowledges the guidance and encouragement provided by Dr.
Michael W. Gordon, Professor of Law, University of Florida.
1. As of Spring 1981, China had approved only 24 joint ventures. Chew-LaFitte, The
Resolution of Transnational Commercial Disputes in the People's Republic of China: A Guide
for U.S. Practitioners, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 236, 247 (1982). Foreign economists
estimate that no more than 750 joint ventures exist today, most of which are tiny textile and
electronic assembly ventures with partners from Hong Kong or Macao. Wall St. J., June 6,
1986, at 28, col. 2.
2. The People's Republic of China Government claims 220 active ventures in coastal
cities. Asian Wall St. . Weekly, Feb. 11, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
3. See Wall St. 3., supra note 1, at 28, col. 2.
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A reassessment of equity joint ventures requires consideration of
China's policy statement in order to discern their significance to Western
relations, China's practical capabilities in venture production and man-
agement, and joint venture experiences as a testing ground for these poli-
cies and capabilities. This Article will discuss these issues as they might
be encountered by an investor entering into a venture with a Chinese
partner and will consider the feasibility of modern China as a venture
site, the cultural climate in which the joint venture must operate, and the
structure required for a successful venture.
II. WESTERN HOPES AND CHINESE POLICIES
China re-entered world trade relatively recently. In 1975 the Peo-
ple's Congress responded to leader Chou En-lai by adopting a new for-
eign trade policy.4 China undertook foreign trade relations to pursue her
goal of the "Four Modernizations": to become as capable in agriculture,
industry, national defense, and science as the world's great powers.5 In
1979 the Congress, led by Zhou's successor Deng Ziaoping, issued the
Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment (Joint Venture Law) and made the joint equity
venture a permissible form of foreign business relationship.6 To counter
foreign investors' objections that the basic Joint Venture Law provided
inadequate guidance and protection, the Congress added tax regula-
tions, 7 labor regulations,' and trademark and patent laws. 9 In September
1983 the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
4. Alford & Birenbaum, Ventures in the China Trade: An Analysis of China's Emerging
Legal Framework for the Regulation of Foreign Investment, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus., 56, 66-
67 (1981).
5. Id. at 67. The Four Modernizations should be complete in 1990. See also PRC's
Seventh Plan Means Tight Times in 1986-87, Easing as Decade Wears On, Bus. ASIA, Apr. 28,
1986, at 130-31.
6. See Law of the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and
Foreign Investment [Joint Venture Law] (1979), trans. in Shen Shiao-Ming, China's New Law
on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, 34 Sw. L.J. 1183, 1191 (1981).
7. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enter-
prises (1981); The Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax
Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign Enterprises (1982), trans. in 1
CHU, MOSER & NEE, COMMERCIAL, BUSINESS, & TRADE LAW: THE PRC 41-66 (1982).
8. Regulations on Labor Management in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign In-
vestment [Joint Venture Labor Regulations] (1980), trans. in E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Oct.
15, 1980, at 25.
9. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (1982), [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws
for Foreign Business (CCH Austl. Ltd.) V 11-500 (Mar. 14, 1987); Patent Law of the People's
Republic of China (1984), [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH Austl. Ltd.)
11-600 (Mar. 14, 1987).
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(MOFERT) released regulations which were intended to clarify many
restrictions and obligations."°
On October 22, 1985, Deng's government took the next decisive step
to promote economic vitality. The People's Congress issued a program
of economic decentralization." The program's reforms gradually re-
move subsidies while raising workers' pay, ultimately allowing prices to
respond to market conditions.' 2 The new policy also transfers decision-
making authority from officials to industry managers, 13 rewards superior
work performance with higher pay,'4 and permits some private en-
trepreneurial activity.'5 In addition, middle-level managers gain a mea-
sure of authority to enter into foreign contracts.' 6
Proponents hope the reform will create a free market to ease the
Government's burden of industry subsidies and allow Chinese industry
to gain technical capability rapidly from Western industry. The resultant
improved goods, produced in volume, could generate sufficient foreign
exchange to offset expenditures for foreign technology and materials,
thereby maintaining a positive Chinese trade balance. The goal is to raise
the standard of living through domestic sales of the improved goods.
17
To serve these ends, the policy favors joint ventures that minimize
foreign exchange.' 8 Favored joint venture proposals produce products
that can compete in world markets, apply advanced technology to
restructure China's existing enterprises, use new technology and equip-
ment in China, and augment foreign exchange income by means other
10. Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People's Republic of China on
Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment [Joint Venture Regulation] (1983),
trans. in BEIJING REv., Oct. 10, 1983, supplement. See generally Note, The People's Republic
of China-1983 Joint Venture Implementing Regulations-The Supplement of Detail to Attract
Foreign Investment, 15 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389 (1985).
11. Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Reform of
the Economic Structure [October Reforms] (1984). See PRC Economic Reforms Will Shift
Reliance to Market Focus, Bus. ASIA, Oct. 26, 1984, at 337 [hereinafter PRC Economic
Reforms].
12. PRC Economic Reforms, supra note 11, at 337-38; What MCNs Should Expect From
China's Reforms: Benefits and Snags, Bus. INT'L., Nov. 2, 1984, at 345-46.
13. PRC Economic Reforms, supra note 12, at 337; What MFNs Should Expect From
China's Reforms: Benefits and Snags, supra note 12, at 346.
14. PRC Economic Reforms, supra note 12, at 337; What MFNs Should Expect From
China's Reforms: Benefits and Snags, supra note 12, at 346.
15. See Reeder, A Small Study of a Big Market in the People's Republic of China-The
"Free Market" System, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1983, at 74, 75.
16. See Bennett, The Party Resists Change In China's Factories, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1985,
at 30, col. 1.
17. See generally China, The New Revolution, Miami Herald, Mar. 28-30, 1985, at IA,
col. 3.
18. See Wassermann, China's Expanding Trade, 19 J. WORLD TRADE L. 542, 543 (1985).
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than the export of produce.19
The reforms appear strikingly successful because of a rare conver-
gence of events. High expectations led Chinese consumers to spend rec-
ord amounts in 1984,20 while industrial output rose 13.6 percent.2 '
Many Chinese attributed the new prosperity to the reforms.22 Prompted
by their optimism, many Chinese undertook entrepreneurial activity.
23
The people and the Government generally are motivated to tolerate con-
tinued change.24
Given this optimistic atmosphere, investors have many good rea-
sons to consider joint venture agreements with Chinese partners. The do-
mestic market is the world's largest.25 Yet, there is little competition
from Western quality products, which cannot be sold legally in China, or
from Chinese goods, which are scarce and inferior in quality to Western
products.
The land offers a variety of raw materials for industrial supply, in-
cluding oil, minerals, and coal.26 Labor costs appear comparable to un-
derdeveloped Asian and South American countries.27 In contrast to
many of these countries, China boasts a rich history and culture which
promise to generate a steady flow of foreign tourist income.28 The new
market appears ripe for development. Indeed, many feel the race for a
China market share will be won within the next several years.29
Not all recent political indicators are positive, however. Many in-
vestors hesitate to rely on China's official position.a0 The reforms may
prove unreliable because they include an interrelated package of simulta-
19. Shen Shiao-Ming, supra note 6, at 1186.
20. In 1984 the consumer sector, producing televisions, tape recorders, electric fans,
washing machines, and refrigerators, sold between 50% and 190% of 1983 sales. Asian Wall
St. J. Weekly, Jan. 21, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
21. Id. Industrial growth is booming in 1986. See PRC's Seventh Plan Means Tight
Times in 1986-87, Easing as Decade Wears On, supra note 5, at 130.
22. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 17, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 2, col. 3. But see Sterba, Peking's Streets Teem With Merchants Again As State
Loosens Reins, Wall St. J., June 16, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
25. See Comment, Legal and Economic Considerations on Doing Business in the People's
Republic of China, 12 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 353, 381 (1982) (China has one billion consumers).
26. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 95-96.
27. Id. at 96. Even with the wage surcharge required by the Joint Venture Law, overall
costs remain competitive with Asian and African sites.
28. Id. at 95.
29. Export License Labyrinth: A Chinese Puzzle for High Tech Sales to PRC, Bus. INT'L,
Sept. 7, 1984, at 281, 285.
30. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 2, at 12, col. 1.
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neous changes in economics and ideology. 3' Failure in one area may
undermine all reform. For instance, a crop failure resulting in famine
could cause an abrupt retreat into isolationism. Likewise, an increase of
corruption among officials could generate a counter-reform movement to
expel the negative force of foreign influence.32
Forces of economic failure and political opposition already have
produced cycles of failure and retreat. Between 1975 and 1978 Beijing's
determination and popular enthusiasm for an earlier decentralization
campaign encouraged lower officials to conclude many foreign trade con-
tracts. Beijing initially failed to recognize the volume of purchases in-
volved. By 1979, however, China's commitment to imports clearly
exceeded its export capabilities and meager foreign exchange reserves.33
The overextension violated China's determination to invite contacts
while maintaining economic autonomy.34 As a result, Beijing cancelled
the contracts or delayed work commencement indefinitely.35
The Government thereafter restructured its goals to accommodate
the economy's weak points, particularly the lack of capital and infra-
structure. The Four Modernizations were redefined to emphasize high
technology and light industry.36 An end to retrenchment was declared in
July 1982.11
This economic resolution unfortunately failed to clear the way for
reform. Marxist-Maoist conservatives continued to complain of profi-
teering, bribery, corruption, and widespread moral laxity stimulated by
decentralization of authority. 38 In late 1983 newly affluent peasants suf-
fered harassment and beatings by reactionaries who accused them of
31. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 22, at 2, col. 1.
32. See id. at 2, col. 2.
33. See Chinese Bull in China Shop, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1981, at 78.
34. Note, An Analysis of Chinese Contractual Policy and Practice, 27 WAYNE L. REV.
1229, 1235 (1981) (citing Holtzmann, Resolving Disputes in U.S.-China Trade, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 84 (H. Holtzmann, ed. 1976). See also Chew-
LaFitte, supra note 1, at 249-52; Lussenberg, Joint Venture Investment in the People's Republic
of China: A Continuing Challenge, 63 CAN. BAR REV. 545, 554 (1985).
35. However, some investors assert that programs essential to the Four Modernizations
continued as planned in 1979-8 1. Moga, Making Foreign Things Serve China: A Western Li-
censor's Guide to the Chinese Market, 28 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 771, 782-83 (1984). A notable
casualty in these cancellations was phase II of the Baoshan Steel Joint Venture. See Comment,
"Far from the Tiger's Mouth'" Present Practice and Future Prospects for the Settlement of
Foreign Commercial Disputes in the People's Republic of China, 3 J.L. & COM. 115, 118-19
(1983).
36. See Moga, supra note 35, at 779-80.
37. Wall St. J., July 27, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
38. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 22, at 2, col. 2.
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"spiritual pollution." 9 Deng officially deplored the dissidents' values
and disgraced the leaders.4 Marxist-Maoist proponents await an oppor-
tunity to take advantage of a wave of popular dissatisfaction forcing a
return to conservatism.41
Cycles of initiative and retreat will undoubtedly recur, since the re-
forms require painful transitions. Hoarding, bankruptcies, inflation, and
windfall profits as a result of price deregulation have created shortages.42
The popular enthusiasm supporting reform may erode as many peasant
farmers are forced from their traditional lifestyles into jobs in light indus-
try and mechanized farming.43 Some officials and urban Chinese in-
volved in businesses have succumbed to profiteering and graft." Deng
acknowledged the vitality of objections to reform at the Communist
Party Conference of September 1985, denouncing the "injustice... in-
herent in capitalism."4 The Government yet manages to maintain its
generally favorable stance toward foreign business.
46
Despite the level of commitment to joint ventures voiced by the Chi-
nese and the interest of Western investors, impediments to rapid growth
remain. China's rudimentary manufacturing, transport, and financial in-
frastructures pose problems. Some disgruntled investors assert that Chi-
nese attitudes and policies block real progress;47 the Chinese claim
Western investors are impatient because they fail to understand China.4 8
However, new understanding may not engender investor patience or
profits. To assess the feasibility of a joint venture, an investor must
understand China's deep-rooted reservations about Western thought and
practice.
39. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 22, at 2, cols. 3, 4.
40. See id. Analysts speculate that Deng manipulated conservative activism to create an
opportunity to suppress it and affirm his policies. Id.
41. Id. at cols. 2, 3.
42. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1985, at 34, col. 1.
43. China's goal is to urbanize 40% of its peasants by the year 2000. Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, supra note 2, at 12, col. 1.
44. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 22, at 3, col. 1. See also Wall St. J., supra note
42, at 34, col. 2 (example of grain company employee who received a death sentence for scalp-
ing grain coupons).
45. China's Party Conference: Victory for Reform- But..., Bus. ASIA, Sept. 27, 1985, at
307, 308 [hereinafter China's Party Conference].
46. Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1985, at 36, col. I (every area except foreign trade and investment
under scrutiny for "unhealthy tendencies").
47. Wall St. J., supra note 1, at 28, col. 2.
48. Id.
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III. THE JOINT VENTURE'S CULTURAL CONTEXT
Tempting as the belief is that China is inviting foreign cultures to
lead it through an industrial revolution to Western capitalism, the reality
is that China consciously values its 3000 years of cultural heritage.49
China sees little it considers worthwhile in past Western culture and
much it deems undesirable.5 0
A. Interaction with the West
From the first unsought and unwelcome European contacts, China
limited the foreign presence on its soil. China's emperor restricted for-
eign merchants to short-term visits for declared purposes in designated
coastal trading enclaves.51 No foreigner received permission to do busi-
ness directly with the Government, producers, or consumers.52
European demands ultimately eroded the Chinese policy. In 1750
Great Britain forced the Chinese to open five cities for trade. 3 Wresting
political and judicial control from local hands, Europeans exploited
coastal areas with virtual immunity from suit.54 In the revolution of
1949, a Russian "advisor" elite replaced the Europeans." All of China
was divided into spheres of foreign influence by 1960.56 Only since the
Russians were ejected in 1960 has China been free of privileged
foreigners.
5 7
B. Business and Trade Customs
Even supposing it did not have a deep-seated mistrust of foreigners,
China has no need for a Western model of private industry. Its own
model, the Chinese trading firm, differs jarringly from Western capital-
ism. The trading firm represented the basic entity of Chinese commercial
activity from the 1600s to 1949, and still maintains legitimacy. 8 The
traditional Chinese firm illustrates the roles and relationships the Chi-
nese consider appropriate for business.
49. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 61-64.
50. See Van Ness, Don't Count on Changing the Chinese, Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan.
21, 1985, at 10, col. 1.
51. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 61.
52. Id. at 61.
53. Id. at 61-62.
54. See id. at 61-63.
55. Id. at 62-63.
56. Id. at 64.
57. Id.
58. See generally Chan, The Original Structure of the Traditional Chinese Firm and its
Modern Reform, Bus. HIsT. REV., Summer 1982, at 218.
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Such firms traditionally were not producers of goods. Instead, firms
distributed goods originally produced by imperial monopolies or by cot-
tage industries. 9 The large firm which traded in goods produced by a
royal monopoly existed by government grant and for the benefit of its
patron, a government official. That is, it existed primarily to provide
revenues for the Government. 60 Under this system, relations with cus-
tomers and colleagues were less important than the firm's relationship
with the government patron.61 This model, with its government affilia-
tion, underlies modern Chinese business entities. Despite decentraliza-
tion, a Western investor cannot assume that a Chinese partner acts
independently.
Chinese firms seek long-term associations, consistent with the gen-
eral Chinese view towards business relations.62 Dealings that Western
businesspersons consider to be arm's-length transactions generally take
place under the cloak of friendship. The Chinese concept of "friendship"
traditionally encompasses a permanent relationship of obligations.63 To
cultivate these obligations, the Chinese use a variety of stratagems to ma-
nipulate feelings of favor, guilt, or dependence.' 4 For example, modern
high-level officials may write personal notes, send gifts, and host ban-
quets, creating the environment of goodwill that the Chinese favor as a
basis for agreement.65
C. The Chinese View of Authority and Reward
A description of the structure of the traditional trading firm also
reveals the traditional employer-employee relationship. It consisted of a
central absolute authority, the merchant-owner, and semi-autonomous,
paid managers located in branch units who trained as apprentices in the
59. See Myers, Hidden Goals in Chinese Industrialization: Lessons from Early Moderniza-
tion Attempts, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1982, at 74, 75.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 75-76. Chinese firms rejected a producing role although the government en-
couraged it in a late nineteenth century effort to generate Western levels of productivity. The
short-lived firms were called kuan-tu shang-pan enterprises. Id. at 74.
62. Comment, supra note 25, at 382. An expatriate Chinese-American who has returned
to China on invitation to revitalize his family's factory comments, "[A]I1 business is done here
by a word and a handshake." National Geographic: Four Americans in China (PBS television
broadcast, Feb. 13, 1985).
63. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 20, at 1, col. 2.
64. Id. The term "friendship" even serves for feelings resulting from any mutually benefi-
cial relationship with an aspect of trust. See, e.g., Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 20, at
18, col. 4.
65. Id. at 18, col. 4.
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owner's main establishment.66 Owners traditionally valued their manag-
ers as much for personal loyalty as for business ability.
6 7
Managers had authority and responsibility subject only to owner
veto. They received a salary that was supplemented by a fixed share of
ten to forty percent of net profits. 8 The manager in turn hired clerks
and apprentices for his branch who were from his own or the owner's
home province, choosing on the basis of personal recommendations.69
Clerks' wages were low, but they also received supplementary profit per-
centage bonuses.70 None of these bonuses could be converted to owner-
ship shares as in Western business.71
D. The Chinese View of the Group and the Individual
Knowledge of the firm's structure also provides some insight into
the Chinese individual's role in a business entity. All staff except the
senior manager lived on the premises in order to work sixteen-hour days,
seven days per week. The clerks' families were forbidden to move to the
town where the work was located.72 Instead, each employee returned to
his home province for one to two months once a year.73 All workers in
this system expected the work experience to dominate their lives and val-
ued the intense involvement with a secure workplace "family." The ex-
isting factory system closely resembles the traditional Chinese firm,
providing housing, child care, and meals, and often requires employees to
work a twelve-hour day.74
Recent studies provide further insight into the Chinese view of the
individual and the group. Self-actualization for a Chinese worker is de-
fined in terms of service to the community. 75 American assumptions-
individual freedom, accountability, and reward-appear only in recent
66. See Chan, supra note 58, at 219-20. See generally Myers, supra note 59, at 74-75.
67. See Chan, supra note 58, at 219-20. This pattern is often followed today. One suc-
cessful firm uses teams of two managers: one hired for talent, one for loyalty. Id. at 226. The
manager often has a written agreement. See id. at 220. He is liable for losses from negligence
or dishonesty. Id.
68. Id. at 220. The bonus is calledjen-li, or "human labor share". Id.
69. Id. at 221.
70. Id. at 220-21.
71. Id. at 226.
72. Id. at 221.
73. Id. at 220-21.
74. Id. at 220.
75. Nevis, Cultural Assumptions and Productivity: The United States and China, SLOAN
MGMT. REV. (M.I.T.), Spring, 1983, at 17, 21.
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ideology statements.76 An inventory of Chinese priorities shows such
self-interest does not dominate business dealings.
Conformity to ideology is to the Chinese worker top priority.77 Fol-
lowing such ideology, workers value (in descending order) bonuses and
wages, personal ambition or aspiration, a happy family life, honorable
title, expertise, and fame. Below these ranks concern with promotion. 78
These values underlie a society in which a valuable member subju-
gates personal attainment to group goals. The individual's reward is a
sense of belonging. In accord with these values, a Chinese worker will
reject individual praise because effective recognition emphasizes the ac-
complishment itself as a benefit to the group. Bonus pay is more likely to
bring greater satisfaction than promotion, which invites confusion for the
worker and jealousy from others.79
Undeniably, these values are slowly shifting. The Chinese recognize
weaknesses in such strong group identification, just as Western firms
have recognized the harmful effects of ruthless self-promotion among
workers and have tried to engender a stronger group image to promote
cooperation. 80 For the foreseeable future, the standard American man-
agement model which allows workers equal opportunity to compete for
unlimited rewards cannot be relied upon to satisfy needs among Chinese
board members or factory line workers.8 '
E. The Chinese View of Law, Contract, and Bureaucracy
A Western investor may better understand Chinese dispute resolu-
tion by envisioning a system utilizing a continuum of methods of increas-
ing formality and coercion: friendly consultation, then friendly
consultation with outside help, nonbinding conciliation, arbitration, and
finally, litigation. This view in practice so confuses Westerners that
scholars have written at length on the Chinese dispute resolution
system. 2
76. See id. at 19-22. See, e.g., Reeder, supra note 15, at 74 (enthusiasm for entrepreneurial
activity in the People's Markets).
77. See Nevis, supra note 75, at 23.
78. Id.
79. See id. at 19-22.
80. See id. at 19, 23.
81. See id. at 17.
82. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 92-93; Note, supra note 34, at 1238. See
generally Pettit, Dispute Resolution in the People's Republic of China, ARB. J., Nov. 1, 1984, at
3, 4; Li, Reflections on the Current Drive Toward Greater Legalization in China, 10 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 221 (1980); Lubman, Mao and Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in
Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284 (1967).
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The Chinese abhor compulsion or coercion and do not rely upon it.
Instead, Chinese culture orders society by standards called li.83 Good
people aspire to conform to Confucian ii; no honest person behaves so
badly that fa, or law, limits action. In addition to li, Buddhist-Taoist
doctrine requires the Chinese to choose compromise over conflict.84 As a
result, the Chinese ideally resolve all disputes by understanding the needs
of the other party, taking their own needs into consideration, and agree-
ing on an equitable solution.8" Third party arbitration and litigation are
anathema to orderly society, and signal hostility and rejection.
Western society, by contrast, traditionally relies on the law, only
recently incorporating into its justice system a continuum of cooperative,
informal dispute resolution methods akin to that of China.86 Businesses
in the West, however, have always cooperated and compromised to pre-
serve mutually profitable long-term relations. An investor may better
understand the Chinese system by comparing Western business practices
that seek amicable solutions without recourse to compulsion.
Chinese mistrust of law inevitably colors the perception of lawyers.
Few trained lawyers existed in China in 1979, and despite rhetoric favor-
ing their education and practice, only a slightly larger number practice
today.87 They act only in limited capacities and are not advocates in the
Western sense. 88 The Chinese lawyer traditionally has acted as a "seeker
of truth," a mediator, whose first duty was to serve the state.89
Just as the Chinese eschew reliance on written law, they also avoid
using detailed contracts to govern business relationships. Custom and re-
lationship traditionally assured smooth business dealings. When con-
fronted with sharp Western dealings, Chinese merchants appropriated a
two-page, standard form contract drafted to protect only their own inter-
ests.9" Since 1949, the commercial contract has also served as a planning
instrument for the state.91 In such cases, the contract is a statement of
optimistic intention, not of binding obligation. In light of historical pro-
tectionism, recent contract legislation has created much confusion.
92
83. Note, supra note 34, at 1230-31.
84. Id. at 1231.
85. Id. at 1239. E.g., if Chinese managers fail to agree, government ministers negotiate,
adopting the same positions as their subordinates. Id.
86. See, e.g., Ingriselli, Resolving Contract Disputes With Chinese Firms, Nat'l L. J., Sept.
10, 1984, at 20, col. 1 (commercial disputes resolved by private mediation firm).
87. See Lussenberg, supra note 34, at 548-50.
88. Id. at 549.
89. See Comment, supra note 25, at 357.
90. Note, supra note 34, at 1241, 1252-58.
91. Comment, supra note 25, at 385.
92. New Chinese Contract Law, Bus. ASIA, April 5, 1985, at 108.
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Use of an executory contract to guarantee individual acts is alien to Chi-
nese relationships.
Influences from Chinese tradition have shaped practical and ideo-
logical realities in China and continue to affect business relationships at
both policy and personal levels. They also shape the physical environ-
ment with which the investor must cope by isolating China from Western
ideas and from world commerce. The equity joint venture that recog-
nizes and accommodates these influences has the greatest potential for
overcoming the obstacles to success.
IV. STRUCTURING THE JOINT VENTURE FOR THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
A. Making Contact with Potential Partners
The Chinese prefer to do business with personal friends. If such a
relationship does not exist, it must be built before business begins.
The Chinese market may be accessed only by invitation.93 Expatri-
ate Hong Kong merchants made the first investments in 1979 by relying
on family ties to make sound contacts. 94 Many Hong Kong firms now
specialize in matching Western investors with venture partners.95 Some
Chinese nationals living abroad also promote personal contacts intended
to develop into business relationships by a chain of referrals. Other pri-
vate individuals approach potential investors with claims of government
or business influence, primarily with low-level officials or middle-level
managers with recently acquired contracting authority. 96
The foreign investor should thoroughly investigate any contact offer.
The contact individual should have both sound personal relationships
with active Chinese officials and businessmen and a business reputation
for credibility.97 In addition, the foreign investor should require an un-
93. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Aug. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
94. See Kraar, A Little Touch of Capitalism, FORTUNE, April 18, 1983, at 1221. Hong
Kong entrepreneurs continue to make a large volume of China trade deals by cultivating a
circle of influential business contacts. Most are simple "suitcase companies" reselling goods
into the China market. Nearly half their attempted transactions fail. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
Nov. 12, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
95. Mating PRC Land, Labor With Hong Kong Shipping To Help Open Market, BUS.
ASIA, Mar. 2, 1984, at 69.
96. What Firms Can Expect As Economic Reforms Take Root in China, Bus. ASIA, Jan. 4,
1985, at 9, 10. But see Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at 6, col. 1 (urgent phone calls,
whispered negotiations, and secret meetings "like the Wild West").
97. Arnold, With a Client in China, 87 CoM. L.J., Apr. 1982, at 170, 171.
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conditional introduction to avoid unnecessary complications.98
A handful of major United States law firms have attained expertise
in China trade since 1979.19 These firms may provide excellent contacts.
However, an investor should bear in mind the negative attitudes that
Chinese harbor toward lawyers, and utilize the attorney for referrals and
behind-the-scenes advice only."° A number of large firms have added
Chinese-speaking associates since 1983, traveled to China, and recruited
Chinese interns.101 These firms, however, may not offer expertise and
lack the long-term relationships most helpful to an investor. Neither do
the new Chinese law firms offer a reliable service, since their lawyers
generally do not act as client advocates." 2
The China International Trust and Investment Corporation
(CITIC), a government bureau established in October 1979, can provide
contacts with potential partners. 10 3 An investor whose objectives coin-
cide with government goals may benefit from CITIC guidance, since the
Chinese partner chosen by the government agency may be favored by
other approving agencies. Trade shows and business symposia have also
provided many initial contacts. 1'
After identifying a partner, but before starting negotiations, an in-
vestor has an opportunity to establish the basis for both a sound relation-
ship and productive negotiations. Experienced foreign traders urge an
investor to provide internal materials describing the company and public
assessments from trade journals. 105 Chinese officials and managers verify
advance information and assess preliminary proposals. 106
Since the decentralization reforms, identifying a capable partner has
become far more complicated. Formerly, an investor was invited to visit
China to see a single potential partner, a government ministry represen-
98. What Firms Can Expect As Economic Reforms Take Root in China, supra note 96, at
10.
99. Ingriselli, supra note 86, at 20, col. 1.
100. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
101. See Ingriselli, supra note 86, at 20, col. 1.
102. See id.
103. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 83-84; Chew-Lafitte, supra note 1, at 246.
104. E.g., Bishop Graphics began a relationship which grew into a joint venture at the Aug.
1980 Trade Show in Hong Kong. See Electronics Joint Venture in PRC Shenzen Zone Sets a
Good Example, Bus. ASIA, May 4, 1984, at 137 [hereinafter Electronics Joint Venture]. China's
Hong Kong seminar in Nov. 1984 sought investors for SEZs and Hainan. Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, Nov. 19, 1984, at 8, col. 2.
105. Negotiating in Japan: A BI Checklist for Successful Bargaining, Bus. INT'L, Nov. 23,
1984, at 370 (on prenegotiations with Japanese firms).
106. Arnold, supra note 97, at 174.
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tative. 107 Factories now may have contracting authority, subject to unac-
knowledged government patronage and veto power.108 Investors advise a
visiting investor to accept each factory tour offered, then to initiate nego-
tiations with three possible manager-partners. 10 9
B. Assessing a Partner's Capabilities
Two attributes identify a strong partner: a solid government patron
and adequate financial resources.' 10 To verify a claim of high connec-
tions in government, the Western investor typically holds a banquet and
invites the government patron, to determine whether the managers can
produce a high level official. I" Because they are unable to rely on West-
ern-style credit information banks to determine financial resources, in-
vestors simply ask detailed questions. They report that the Chinese give
reliable responses to questions about capital.'
1 2
Legal limits on contracting authority serve as general guides in
structuring a venture. For example, all Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
can approve contracts valued at five million dollars or less.' The City
of Chonquin has authority to bypass provincial approval to directly ob-
tain final authority from Beijing.' The new China Textile Industrial
Corporation for Foreign Economic and Technical Cooperation and the
China Textile Machinery Corporation also can obtain direct Beijing ap-
proval. Any factory in a Special Economic Zone theoretically has au-
thority to form a contract valued in excess of the average value of
existing joint ventures or (approximately two million dollars)." 5
In fact, Chinese managers are still reluctant to exercise their deci-
sion-making power. Most managers lack experience in buying materials
to supplement state raw materials allotment. 16 Party officials who dis-
tribute state allotments have greater expertise and often pressure manag-
107. Wall St. J., April 25, 1985, at 34, col. 4.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
111. Wall St. J., supra note 107, at 34, col. 4.
112. Id. A Chinese partner often lacks the supply and marketing information the investor
needs, but the investor should persevere in getting answers to all questions. What to Watch
While Planning a China Joint Venture, Bus. ASIA, Sept. 20, 1985, at 299 [hereinafter What to
Watch].
113. Incentivesfor lnvestors in China's 14 Cities, Bus. AsIA, Aug. 10, 1984, at 251-52 [here-
inafter Incentives for Investors]. Tianjin and Shanghai can approve US$30 million contracts;
and Dalian can approve US$10 million, as can provincial governments. Id.
114. Wall St. J., Sept. 5, 1984, at 36, col. 1.
115. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 3, 1984, at 17, col. 3.
116. Comment, supra note 25, at 374.
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ers to share their new authority to determine factory production levels.
Through the Workers' and Party Committees, these officials may criti-
cize the manager's ideology for making an independent decision. 17 In
line with political caution and tradition, the Chinese are likely to make
such decisions by consultation with many colleagues over a period of
time.
18
Managers, nevertheless, do make contracts pursuant to their new
authority. The investor should avoid relying on promises the manager
cannot fulfill. For example, because another concurrent contract may
supply substantially similar technology, any payment for technology
transfer logically must be suspect until the Government approves it.11 9
A Chinese manager cannot know he will be unable to fulfill the promise
until the Government vetoes it.
1 20
C. Forming a Basis for a Successful Relationship
An investor may to some extent counter mistrust and conform to
Chinese relationship patterns by cultivating a strong, consistent image
and emphasizing fairness and friendship.1 2' To build this image a negoti-
ating party should establish a personal, but not familiar, relationship
with each member of the Chinese team. 122 Initial contacts are likely to
consist of small talk, itinerary planning, and polite statements of hopes
for successful negotiation. Foreign guests making frivolous remarks or
references to politics risk appearing disrespectful."2 3 Any display of an-
ger, even for tactical purposes, conveys an impression of unreliability.
124
Ostentatious presentations have failed to impress high officials nego-
117. Arnold, supra note 97, at 171. See also Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at
17, col. 3.
118. Arnold, supra note 97, at 171.
119. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 22, 1984, at 6, col. 1.
120. Id. at 6, col. 2. Western investors become confused by the Chinese concept of govern-
ment-business interdependence, and expect to rely on government type benefits while retaining
private enterprise independence. Id.
121. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. Western business misunderstands
China's long memory. One negotiator mistakenly refers to a "historical relationship of trust
and confidence." Arnold, supra note 97, at 175.
122. See Negotiating in Japan: A BI Checklist for Successful Bargaining, supra note 105, at
371. The checklist also advises the following: 1) do not assume the negotiator with the best
command of English is the most important member; instead, address the whole team; 2) use
full names and maintain a formal posture; 3) allow silences; the team may be considering an
important point; 4) if a question is met with evasion, consider why and rephrase it to avoid the
sticking point. Id.
123. Comment, supra note 25, at 384.
124. See id. However, companies have forced breakthroughs after weeks of negotiations
without progress by threatening to go home. Id.
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tiating early joint ventures; however, an investor may reassess the most
effective presentation style for mid-level managers. The most acceptable
style eschews boasting and understates individual accomplishments as
mere duties beneficial to the group. 12 An effective presentation conveys
an impression of the company's extremely effective cooperative effort,
without praising personal qualities of any individual.
At events with mixed business and social purposes, the Chinese may
be uncertain about the desired level of involvement with foreign guests.
Lengthy private conversations or visits to a manager's home may expose
a Chinese contact to private or government censure. Nevertheless, West-
ern products have been popular in China since 1985 and a foreign guest
should expect ambivalent curiosity.
A foreign visitor should avoid any inference of bribery. Bureau-
cratic corruption has been the target of protesters' letters and posters
since Deng allowed limited public dissent. To curtail a growing trend, a
1980 regulation restricts acceptance of foreigners' gifts by Chinese offi-
cials. 126 The negotiator who broaches the subject implies his partner is
dishonest and ideologically unsound.127
D. Choosing Time, Place, and Strategy for Negotiation
An effective negotiating strategy identifies Chinese wants and needs
and develops proposals that match such interests with those of the for-
eign investor.128 Many failures result from miscommunication of pro-
posals. A team that stands a good chance of clear communication of
ideas and terms ideally includes both a hired neutral interpreter who is
experienced in business transactions 29 and a member familiar with Chi-
nese business customs, philosophy, and politics. 30 Frequently, one indi-
vidual fills both roles. Such a "China hand" may be either a corporate
associate or an outsider.
To form a basis for verbal communication, an investor should put
the company's position into writing as soon as possible. The most useful
initial proposals state common ground first, saving major points of con-
tention until the parties have built an environment of agreement. '
3
125. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
126. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 92 (citing State Council Decision on Not Giving
or Receiving Gifts in Foreign Affairs Activities).
127. Comment, supra note 25, at 384.
128. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 96.
129. Negotiating in Japan: A BI Checklist for Successful Bargaining, supra note 105, at
371.
130. Arnold, supra note 97, at 171.
131. See, e.g., id. at 175.
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Before discussing terms, the Chinese team will seek every technical detail
the investor will divulge. A foreign investor can protect the company's
negotiating position by preparing a plan to release technical information
to satisfy demand. The disclosure should be tied to the progress of nego-
tiating talks, and should identify matters to be withheld until the parties
complete the agreement.'32
Virtually all final contract discussions take place near the intended
joint venture site. The Chinese partner uses existing meeting rooms or
public rooms in the hotel chosen for the foreign guest. The number and
duration of meetings vary greatly. In general, Chinese teams prefer
lengthy discussions to develop the relationship.133 If the parties have an
ongoing relationship, however, the contract may be finalized within
days.
134
Investors find Chinese negotiators to be patient, persistent, and ad-
ept at bargaining for advantageous terms. 135 They are quick to label an
offer "noncompetitive" with other similar proposals. However, they ac-
tually are unlikely to hold the "Dutch auction" that the comparison of
proposals implies.1 36 Having established an environment for understand-
ing and agreement and bearing in mind Chinese goals and negotiation
customs, the negotiator can focus on the joint venture contract.
E. Drafting the Contract
The Chinese are placing greater reliance on contracts as trade inter-
action becomes more complex. However, contracts still are used primar-
ily to regulate foreign performance. The traditional Chinese aversion to
detailed contract terms remains and can only be minimized by creating
an environment of trust and good communication. The foreign investor
who does business in the Chinese manner-without a written docu-
ment-undertakes considerable risks. Chinese law fills few gaps left by
132. The manager of the China Department of the Chartered Bank observes that the Chi-
nese have no concept of time as money. Kraar, supra note 94, at 128. See generally What to
Watch, supra note 112, at 299.
133. But see Electronics Joint Venture, supra note 104, at 137 (citing example of Bishop
Graphics, a California firm, which exported to China from 1979 to 1983, then negotiated a
joint venture in three days to upgrade an existing Shenzhen factory). Without prior relation-
ship, the minimum on record may be three months. Id. at 137-38; Selling the China Market:
It Doesn't Always Take, Bus. INT'L., Feb. 17, 1984, at 68-69 (Hart non-electric dishwashers)
[hereinafter Selling the China Market].
134. Comment, supra note 25, at 384, 385 (citing China's Narrow Door to the West, FOR-
TUNE, Mar. 26, 1979, at 64). The company may wish to withhold some information until the
contract receives government approval.
135. Id. at 382.
136. Comment, supra note 25, at 383.
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the parties, 137 and a general statement of purpose and means leaves unan-
ticipated problems to be resolved without clear guidelines.
138
A detailed contract greatly improves the likelihood of joint venture
success by providing the law of the transaction. 139 Chinese custom dic-
tates adherence to the literal interpretation of the document, without re-
course to extrinsic evidence." Admittedly, even extreme care may fail
to fill all gaps without introducing unintended ambiguity, but the negoti-
ator should document agreement on all major negotiated points and
identify contingency plans.
F. Dealing with Governmental Bureaucracy
Extensive bureaucracy has guided Chinese life for hundreds of
years. 4 1 The decentralization reforms may shift power to a larger
number of officials, but are unlikely to affect the bureaucracy's pervasive
influence. A single Ministry of Foreign Trade supervises, negotiates, and
licenses most business through the State Council regardless of the part-
ner's identity. It also controls customs and funds the Chinese Foreign
Trade Corporation, a partner in many foreign trade transactions. 142
Joint venture licensing and registration may sorely try a foreign in-
vestor's determination. Even a highly desirable joint venture may wait
three months for approval. I4 3 Though the Joint Venture Law authorizes
broad self-determination powers, 144 the central, provincial, and local
governments retain informal controls to protect their arenas of responsi-
bility. 145  To add to the confusion, these government branches do not
customarily coordinate their actions or share information.'46
Some simplified bureaucratic procedures have been implemented in
137. Comment, supra note 25, at 385. See also Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 101.
138. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 101.
139. Note, supra note 34, at 1242.
140. Comment, supra note 25, at 385. However, the Chinese in some instances have ig-
nored the custom of strict adherence to contract. Id. at 1245 n. 143. See also Note, Foreign
Investment in the People's Republic of China: Compensation Trade, Joint Ventures, Industrial
Property Protection and Dispute Settlement, 10 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L. 233, 253 n.42 (1983).
141. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 83-84.
142. Note, supra note 34, at 1236.
143. JVs in China: Details of AMC's Big Jeep-Making Pact, Bus. ASIA, June 10, 1983, at
180 [hereinafter JVs in China].
144. Joint Venture Law art. 6.
145. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 82.
146. Id. at 83. For example, a joint venture to introduce modem electroplating technology
waited for secondary approvals because its Chinese partner, the ministry controlling most of
the materials, did not also control bulk chemicals. US Firm's Deal Signals Widening PRC
Market for JVProducts, Bus. ASIA, Mar. 23, 1984, at 89, 90 [hereinafter U.S. Firm's Deal].
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SEZs, and may come into broader use if favored by the Government. 47
Beijing recognizes that bureaucracy impedes business development, and
encourages local governments to relinquish a degree of control. 148 The
approval system may become simpler as authorities share techniques for
streamlining without losing control of foreign contracts.14 9
G. Resolving Disputes
Methods for dispute resolution are appropriately addressed at the
outset, before the venture contract is concluded. To choose among avail-
able procedures, the investor needs to understand the Chinese justice sys-
tem well enough to avoid formal litigation and to satisfy a partner's sense
of fair treatment, while resolving the difficulty as efficiently as possible.
The Joint Venture Law requires joint venture boards to settle impor-
tant matters by friendly negotiations.' Such friendly negotiation of dis-
putes has all the difficulties of the precontract negotiations-differing
assumptions about time frame, appropriate subjects, and appropriate
procedures. 5 1  An ongoing friendly relationship assists in reaching
agreement, but in the context of dispute each party must deal with disap-
pointed expectations. The joint venture contract should anticipate these
impediments by specifying the steps to be taken in negotiation and by
setting a reasonable time frame relative to the urgency of resolution. It
should also reserve to the parties the right to call for nonbinding media-
tion at any point.
Nonbinding mediation by a third party may provide a solution that
eluded the partners in private negotiation without damaging the relation-
ship. Any neutral party may mediate, but the procedures to be used
should be agreed upon in advance to facilitate effective talks."5 2 The For-
eign Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (FETAC), an arm of
the China Council for Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), pro-
vides such mediation and other negotiating assistance.15 3 On a written
147. See eg., Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 3 (Canton moving all
foreign trade ministry offices into one building).
148. See id. (projects requiring a dozen department approvals, resulting in indefinite
delays).
149. Id.
150. Joint Venture Law art. 14.
151. See supra notes 121-36 and accompanying text.
152. See Comment, supra note 35, at 123.
153. Id. at 120. FETAC consists of 15 to 21 members whose occupations range from trade
officials and economists to industrialists, transportation experts, insurance agents and interna-
tional lawyers. Commission membership is a part-time responsibility. Not all members are
located in Beijing. Routine work is, therefore, performed by the Legal Affairs Department of
the CCPIT which has a full-time staff of thirty to forty persons. Id. at 123.
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request by one or both parties, FETAC conducts fact finding, asks par-
ties to submit their views in writing, and reviews documentary evi-
dence.15 4 Principles guiding FETAC include respect for the contract, the
desire that each party understand the other's view, noncoercive proceed-
ings, and respect for the law.155 FETAC may abide by the choice of law
specified in the joint venture contract. Upon completing its fact finding,
FETAC indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' positions
and requests reconsideration in order to settle. If the parties continue to
disagree, FETAC will repeat the process. Mediation is usually com-
pleted or terminated in about six months.156
Because FETAC bases its decisions on governmental policies, an in-
vestor may prefer an international arbitrator if the contract allows this
option. Such arbitrators conduct talks at neutral sites outside China.
157
Fully half of twenty-nine trade contracts surveyed called for talks con-
ducted by such mediators, 158 with Stockholm the negotiation site appar-
ently preferred by the Chinese.'59 However, contract legislation effective
July 1, 1985, may limit the choices of law and sites available to joint
ventures. 160 Whichever site is chosen, the parties may include the follow-
ing terms in the venture contract: place of arbitration; arbitral institution
to conduct proceedings; procedural rules; arbitral tribunal (selection
method and umpire); choice of law; finality of award and mechanism of
enforcement; judicial enforcement of arbitration clause; and other terms
as applicable (for example, allocation of costs, language, notification
and discovery procedures, and performance of contract during
arbitration).' 6 '
Careful arbitration may prevent the ruin of a business relationship
since the Chinese undeniably accept the trend to arbitrate international
business disputes. The Chinese Government authorized arbitration cen-
ters in Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Dalian in September 1980, and
plans others.162 Hong Kong lawyers plan to establish a nonprofit arbitra-
154. Id. at 120-21. This procedure resembles new United States mediation techniques in-
volving written statement of position, fact finding, review of evidence and witnesses. United
States mediators deal with parties separately to preserve parties' cases for trial. Nat'l L.J.,
Mar. 4, 1985, at 24.
155. See Comment, supra note 35, at 120-21; Chew-LaFitte, supra note 1, at 252.
156. Id. at 121-22.
157. See id. at 136.
158. Id. Possible arbitrators include the American Arbitration Association, the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Id. at 134.
159. Comment, supra note 35, at 132.
160. New Chinese Contract Law, supra note 92, at 108.
161. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 1, at 275. See also Comment, supra note 35, at 135-36.
162. Comment, supra note 35, at 128.
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tion center, which may provide a satisfactory forum for joint venture
partners. 163
If litigation in the Chinese courts becomes unavoidable, the Legal
Counsel Office of CCPIT provides some advice. 16 A claimant may also
hire counsel, but the lawyer must be Chinese.1 65 The new Chinese law
firms offer their services to such foreign claimants.
166
To avoid litigation a foreign investor should approach all matters on
which a partner disagrees as areas for negotiation and compromise. Be-
cause the Chinese negotiate over long periods, any time limits should be
stated positively as goals at the outset. If the partners cannot agree, then
an informal offer of assistance and advice to give the negotiations new life
posesses the lowest risk of offense. Finally, if no greater loss will result
from ending the relationship than arises from the existing stalemate, a
foreign partner should carefully choose the forum and the remedy to
minimize loss. To ensure the greatest chance of resolution, the joint ven-
ture structure should give each party more to gain by resolving than by
prolonging disputes.167
H. Establishing Duration and Plans for Termination
Anticipating an end to China's need for foreign involvement, the
Government limited the life spans of ventures in some industries. For
example, the investors must turn over large urban hotels to Chinese part-
ners within ten to twenty years.' 68 In other industries, China anticipates
slower development. For example, the City of Dalian, which specializes
in metallurgy and precision instruments, may approve ventures of up to
fifty years' duration.
169
The Joint Venture Law requires the contract period to reflect the
goals of the partners. 70 However, China may approve early termination
if the business suffers losses, one party breaches, or performance becomes
impossible. 17  The Government promises protection in such circum-
163. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 14, col. 3.
164. Comment, supra note 25, at 356. The Government passed the Organic Law for the
People's Courts in 1979. By late 1981, the People's Courts included over 1000 economic
courts. Comment, supra note 35, at 139-40. Some feel the law, encouraged by Deng, results
from the Gang of Four abuses of individuals and institutions. Li, supra note 82, at 227. Such a
view may imply the trend to resort to litigation is reactionary and temporary.
165. Comment, supra note 35, at 139-40.
166. See Lubman, supra note 82, at 1328.
167. Pettit, supra note 82, at 13.
168. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan. 14, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
169. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 3.
170. Joint Venture Law art. 12.
171. Joint Venture Law art. 13.
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stances for "all lawful rights and interests of foreign participants," in-
cluding "resources invested" and "profits due," but it retains control of
premature dissolutions, especially in instances where the contract is si-
lent. 72 Specific venture contract provisions anticipating likely causes for
failure and with specific plans for termination may limit this type of gov-
ernment intervention. 173 In any case, risk of such intervention increases
when the venture provides no more technical advances. The investor
may anticipate discrimination after that time.
A successful venture undeniably must generate some profit within a
reasonable time. Lack of profit has become a major complaint of current
investors. 174 Some businesses have planned only projects that can recoup
an investment within five years. 175 Few joint ventures are able to pro-
duce profits so quickly.
I. Choosing Board Members
The Joint Venture Law provides guidelines for the composition and
function of the joint venture company board of directors reflecting the
Chinese preference for negotiations and consensus. 176 The partners need
not appoint members in proportion to their investment shares. The chair
must be appointed by the Chinese participant, and one or two vice chairs
by the foreign partners. 77 Important decisions must be reached by con-
sultation based on the principles of equality and mutual benefit. 1
7
1
With such broad guidelines, patterns of interaction on joint venture
boards have proved elusive. Representation tends to be proportional to
investment. 179 Even-numbered boards may consist in equal shares of
Chinese and foreign appointments, despite the risk of deadlock.
180
Boards may meet on a set schedule or as needed.' 8 ' The Chinese part-
172. Joint Venture Law art. 2.
173. Baxter, Business with the People's Republic of China, 5 CAN. BAR REV. 337, 355
(1979).
174. Wall St. J., supra note 1, at 30, col. 2.
175. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 3.
176. Joint Venture Law art. 6
177. Id. Board interaction has received considerable attention in East European ventures
in countries which require proportional representations. See generally, Jaslow, Practical Con-
sideration in Drafting a Joint Venture Agreement with China, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 209 (1983).
178. Joint Venture Law art. 6.
179. See, e.g., Wall St. J., June 20, 1983, at 3, col. 1 (noting R.J. Reynolds board with
evenly split participation and representation).
180. See, e.g., Electronics Joint Venture, supra note 104, at 137 (Bishop Graphics' four
member board and three vote majority in a four investor venture); U.S. Firm 's Deal, supra note
146, at 89 (OMI Electroplating's four directors); Wall St. J., supra note 152, at 27, col. I
(evenly split representation on oil joint venture boards as designated management committees).
181. See, e.g., Electronics Joint Ventures, supra note 104, at 137.
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ners generally favor lengthy board consultations on relatively minor
matters. 
8 2
De facto power may frequently govern decisionmaking, regardless
of membership or official leadership. Foreign partners usually hold supe-
rior informal powers in managerial ability and experience, technical
skills, control of agreements to market the product abroad, and opera-
tions control in production, quality, or general management.18 3 A shift-
ing balance of de facto control can be stabilized and emphasized by
agreements identifying particular areas of special authority.18 4 Board
structure may take into account such decisionmaking influences when
acknowledged. 5
J. Setting Investment Share and Type
The Joint Venture Law allows up to one-hundred percent foreign
ownership. 186 Most foreign partners provide technology in the form of
equipment, training, or management. 18 7 Some also invest cash to imple-
ment joint venture plans.18 8 A Chinese partner usually provides existing
or new facilities, employees, and possibly low-level managers. 89 The
Joint Venture Law requires the partners to determine an asset's value by
joint assessment.1 90 The technology of the foreign share must be truly
advanced and appropriate to China's needs, or the foreign partner will be
liable for enterprise losses.191
Foreign investors face a major dilemma when negotiating the value
and protection of technology and other intangibles. Such protections are
absent from Chinese business customs, under which an idea has no
182. One unprepared investor found the first board meeting lasted eight days. See Wall St.
J., April 24, 1985, at 34, col. 4.
183. Jaslow, supra note 177, at 221-23.
184. See e.g., JVs in China, supra note 143, at 180 (AMC jeep board of directors' use of
extensive by-laws to structure its functions, calling for broad initial foreign control despite
AMC's minority position).
185. See Jaslow, supra note 177, at 221-23.
186. Joint Venture Law art. 4. Though possibly a wholly owned enterprise using Chinese
facilities and labor should not be called a joint venture, it functions as one and joint venture tax
laws may apply. See, e.g., 3M's Venture Into China: Some Novel Features and Unanswered
Questions, Bus. INT'L, Dec. 23, 1983, at 401-02.
187. Joint Venture Law art. 5.
188. See e.g., Wall St. J., supra note 179, at 3, col. 1 (R. J. Reynolds invests cash and
equipment). But see, e.g., id. at 18, col. 3 (Del Monte invests "very little money").
189. See, e.g., Selling the China Market, supra note 133, at 69 (China to supply all capital
equipment for Clark Copier joint venture); JVs in China, supra note 143, at 180 (China to
supply all buildings and tools for AMC jeep venture).
190. Joint Venture Law art. 5.
191. Id.
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value. 192 Recognizing that indifferent policies limited technology trans-
fers and domestic incentives for creative achievements,' 93 China imple-
mented a Patent Law on April 1, 1985.'9' This law departs significantly
from Maoist-Marxist ideology, but provides applicants only with limited
protection. Seven categories of creative effort cannot be patented, includ-
ing scientific discoveries, drugs, and foods. 19' The Patent Law, like many
Chinese laws, succeeds only as a reassuring statement of policy.
The Chinese continue to be reluctant to pay for prototypes or other
technology. 196 China's Trademark Law offers no real reassurance, since
it fails to protect trademarks that directly indicate the product's specific
characteristics. 197 In general, protections for intellectual rights fall be-
low Western standards despite efforts to satisfy investors. Even if the law
fully recognized intellectual property rights, the Chinese industrial struc-
ture works against technology protections. When the central govern-
ment purchases technology in a joint venture contract, that knowledge
theoretically becomes available to all of China.
198
Ongoing profit for the foreign investor usually lies not in protecting
exclusive rights to processes and systems, but in supplying training for
producers and services for consumers. Such a service orientation facili-
tates a successful technology transfer that depends on the end user's abil-
ity to use the technology. 99 High-tech firms have developed long-range
strategies involving extensive service commitments to insure buyer satis-
faction and a steady supply of new market contacts. 200 Such a service
and training plan may call for a formal agreement relating demand and
192. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 89-91.
193. PR C's New Patent Law Will Protect Foreign Firms And Spur Local Inventors, Bus.
AsIA, March 30, 1984, at 97.
194. Id. See supra note 9. On April 1 Chinese and foreign businesses filed over 4000 patent
applications. Wall St. J., April 3, 1985, at 34, col. 2.
195. Id. China will not grant patents for the following: scientific discoveries; rules and
methods for mental activities; methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of disease; food,
beverages, and flavorings; pharmaceutical products and substances obtained by means of a
chemical process; animal and plant varieties; and substances obtained by means of nuclear
transformation. It will, however, allow processes used in producing certain products to be
patented. The United States cannot provide effective protection despite more favorable terms
in its Chinese trade agreements. Id.
196. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 89-91.
197. Moga, supra note 35, at 786-87. See supra note 9.
198. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Nov. 15, 1984, at 15, col. 1.
199. Export License Labyrinth, supra note 29, at 285. See also How High Tech Firms Plan
to Service Products in China, Bus. INT'L, Dec. 7, 184, at 386-87 (Digital Equipment Corp.'s
training sessions and self-teaching programs for computer users).
200. Id.
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cost, but the value may be counted as a portion of joint venture
investment.
V. ECONOMIC CONTROL AND FINANCE
A. Financing and Banking
Under the Joint Venture Law, a venture may obtain funds directly
from foreign banks.20 ' In fact, the Chinese Government prefers that ven-
tures obtain financing from banks on their own merits. The Government
has contributed the necessary funds for only a few joint ventures in cru-
cial industries.20 2
A joint venture with government approval will nevertheless find
ready financial aid, since many banks have entered the market since
1979. For example, the Government established the China Investment
Bank in December 1981 to handle increasing business volume.20 3 Re-
cently, the Bank of China enlarged its joint venture loan program.2°
The Bank of America opened a branch in Beijing in February 1984 and
another in Shanghai in October of the same year.20 5 Since the October
reforms, Japanese banks have opened Chinese branches and have
successfully offered foreign investment services to municipal
governments.20 6
The joint venture may conduct most business with the bank of its
choice.20 7 However, to repatriate profits it must register an open foreign
exchange account with the Bank of China.20 8 The joint venture must
generate sufficient foreign exchange credits to balance imports and do-
mestic sales that generated profits for the foreign investor.20 9
In addition to the agreements on sources of initial financing, a joint
venture contract may include agreements on additional financing sources
for future needs. Otherwise, the initial investment and much goodwill
may be lost over relatively small shortages which halt production or
growth. The negotiators should consider which circumstances call for
refinancing and which terms will be acceptable if refinancing is optional.
201. Joint Venture Law art. 8.
202. Comment, supra note 25, at 372.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 119, at 22, col. 4.
206. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Feb. 4, 1985, at 20, col. 1. For a review of available banks,
ownership and services, see Baxter, supra note 173, at 357-58.
207. Joint Venture Law art. 8.
208. Joint Venture Law art. 10.
209. See infra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
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If profits fail to meet expectations, the partners may have great difficulty
agreeing to increase the joint debts. The resultant strife may make a ven-
ture seem risky. For example, the Great Wall Hotel, a joint venture lux-
ury hotel in Beijing, failed to generate profits on schedule because of
construction delays and cost overruns. Disappointed partners blamed
each other and haggled over allocation of costs, giving an impression of
irreconcilable differences. As a result, thirteen of the fourteen banks
holding overdue notes refused to refinance until the Bank of China
agreed to allow all other creditors to collect before it required
repayment.21°
B. Insurance
The joint venture must purchase insurance coverage from a Chinese
insurance company.21' Insurance is a state enterprise and the lead entity
is the People's Insurance Company of China (PICC).2 12 The PICC
wrote only limited types of coverage until 1980, when it entered into
cooperative arrangements with international underwriters.21 3 Today, its
rates and range of services are competitive with worldwide insurers.21 4
The PICC has reciprocal claims agreements with four international firms
and a joint venture with one of the four.2 15
C. Profits, Tax, and Repatriation
In the profits, tax, and repatriation areas, the conflict between the
Chinese national interest and the partners' individual interests cannot be
effectively hidden. Current joint venturers complain that profits are di-
minished by a variety of government surcharges and frustrating repatria-
tion procedures.21 6 China's response is a significant indicator of China's
purposes in foreign ventures.
The Joint Venture Law imposes foreign tax on gross income after
deductions for worker benefits and reinvestment funds,217 which foreign
tax regulations impose only on net income after deduction of costs, ex-
210. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 3, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
211. Joint Venture Law art. 8.
212. Baxter, supra note 173, at 355.
213. How To Arrange Insurance Coverage for PRC Ventures, Bus. ASIA, Oct. 5, 1984, at
316. However, PICC may not provide the sophisticated coverage needed by oil or nuclear
industries. Id.
214. Id. Coverage may include political risk insurance.
215. Id. at 317 (including specifics on purchase of coverage).
216. Wall St. J., supra note 1, at 30, col. 2.
217. Joint Venture Law art. 7.
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penses, and losses.218 The basic tax rate is thirty percent, but a ten per-
cent local surtax increases the total to thirty-three percent.219 China has
structured such venture taxes to achieve government development goals.
Few joint ventures pay the full one-third tax. Ventures with a ten-year
operational life or low-profit operations (such as forestry or remote area
development) can claim tax holiday benefits of up to five years.22
China cut tax rates in half for joint ventures investing in Special
Economic Zones221 or in energy, transport, or harbor facilities in the
fourteen coastal cities.222 Long term coastal projects may now also qual-
ify for tax holidays.223 In addition, coastal joint ventures are exempt
from many import duties on raw materials and equipment and from cus-
tom duties on all exports.2 24 It is doubtful that a foreign venture qualify-
ing for tax breaks would receive government approval at all.
Although willing to reduce some taxes to attract partners with ad-
vanced technology, China appears unwilling to part with the foreign
partner's profit share. Under the Law, joint venture partners distribute
their profits in proportion to their capital contributions. 225 However, the
foreign partner's freedom to repatriate returns is severely restricted.
Profits repatriated through the Bank of China decrease by ten percent
above the standard thirty-three percent tax.226 Any domestic profits
earned in foreign exchange units have been required approximately to
balance foreign exchange disbursements paid from the venture's Bank of
China account. However, an unfavorable foreign exchange rate greatly
reduces domestic profits.227
A number of strategies can preserve some profits, but none repre-
sents a simple or satisfying solution. Taxed profits subsequently rein-
vested for five years in a joint venture provide a forty percent tax rebate
218. Id. See also Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 72.
219. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 72. The tax rate approximates income taxes
required from Chinese entities. Id. It reflects a norm for LDC tax rates. Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, Dec. 7, 1984, at 10, col. 2.
220. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 20.
221. Id. at 10.
222. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at col. 3. The ruling had a retroactive effect
to Jan. 1, 1984. Id.
223. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Dec. 3, 1984, supra note 115, at 10.
224. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at 6, col. 3. Recently, the Government added
a new 7% maintenance tax on all industry and commerce for city construction and renovation.
Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan. 28, 1985, at 20.
225. Joint Venture Law art. 7. See Comment, supra note 98, at 371. China's 1983 billion-
dollar foreign exchange surplus sank to a $900 million deficit in the first quarter of 1985 alone.
Wall St. J., April 16, 1985, at 34, col. 4.
226. See supra notes 207-25 and accompanying text.
227. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 2.
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to the investor on taxes paid.228 The investor may create another entity
which earns exchange on the joint venture's behalf by marketing unre-
lated goods outside China229 or by buying and exporting Chinese
goods.230 All such strategies except reinvestment result in some delay
and loss, as the Government intends.23'
VI. LOCATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
China has designated areas for concentrations of foreign investment.
Ironically, these areas offer a better developed infrastructure because
most were treaty ports under Western domination.232 The Government
offers tax advantages and bureaucratic streamlining to investors who
choose to invest within one of these Special Economic Zones.2 33 The
Government may deny any joint venture attempting to establish itself
elsewhere.
Beijing initially chose four areas for experiments in capitalist busi-
ness. Shenzhen, a 126 square-mile enclave adjacent to Hong Kong terri-
tory, developed most rapidly. Hong Kong investors provided more than
ninety percent of new investment during the first year.234 The other
zones-Zhutai, Shantau, and Xiamen-have developed more slowly.
In mid-1984, the Government announced through a set of regula-
tions that it would also promote fourteen coastal cities as Special Eco-
nomic Zones.235 Although authority of cities to contract without higher
government approval varies, the regulations as applied to ongoing yen-
228. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 75.
229. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 100. Over the last two years the Government
has allowed renminbi value to drop to increase exports. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1985, at 34, col. 1.
Shenzhen may issue a freely convertible currency in 1986. Meanwhile, coastal ventures pay
twice the official exchange rate for dollars. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Feb. 18, 1985, at 12, col.
1. As currency declined and its imports increased, China developed a trade deficit of $890
million in the first quarter of 1985. Wall St. J., supra note 225, at 34, col. 4.
230. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 3.
231. Id. See also New Chinese Rules State How Sino-Foreign JVs Can Solve Forex
Problems, Bus. AsIA, Feb. 10, 1986, at 42 (strategies to solve foreign exchange problems).
232. China Opens 14 Cities, Bus. AsIA, April 13, 1984, at 115. The Government an-
nounced plans to open all coastal areas for foreign investment. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly,
supra note 168, at 17, col. 1.
233. See supra notes 221-33 and accompanying text, and supra notes 147-49 and accompa-
nying text.
234. Kraar, supra note 94, at 121.
235. China Opens 14 Cities, supra note 232, at 115. Shanghai and Dalian can approve
projects for up to $10 million without prior review by Beijing. Other cities can approve
projects for up to $5 million. Incentives for Investors, supra note 113, at 251-52. The average
joint venture investment value is only $2 million. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at 6,
col. 3.
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tures seem to be in accord with rules for the original four zones. Chong-
quing, in central China, has also served as a special laboratory to assess
the effect of economic reforms on the agricultural population representa-
tive of eighty percent of China's citizens.236 A special zone has been iso-
lated on the island of Hainan.23 7 The SEZs offer infrastructures for
particular industries, in addition to bureaucratic advantages. For exam-
ple, Dalian established a district specializing in electronics, precision in-
struments and meters, and metallurgical industries.238 Shanghai set aside
one district for joint ventures and trading centers, and another for for-
eign office and living accommodations.239
Even these SEZs lack many amenities that are taken for granted
throughout the West. Offices and telephones are usually difficult to se-
cure. Beijing has a severe shortage of office space and foreign businesses
must cope with ill-suited hotel accommodations at extremely high
prices.24° Telephones are very expensive and scarce, with installation
costing over $1200.241 Once installed, the telephone is less useful than its
counterpart in the West, because the telecommunications infrastructure
is inadequate to serve the vast country. Only one person in two hundred
has telephone service.242
China's vast, inland natural resources may be entirely unavailable to
a venture business located in a coastal location. China has no notable
transport system; barges on waterways move the greatest volume of
goods. Many roads are unpaved. 243 The railways are overburdened and
antiquated. Even the major ports are relatively shallow and so chroni-
cally congested that ships must often wait weeks or months for loading
berths.
244
236. See Wall St. J., supra note 114, at 36, col. 1.
237. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra, note 104, at 8, col. 2 (attracting investors to 14
cities and Hainan).
238. Incentives for Investors, supra note 113, at 251-52. E.g., Natong plans to construct a
deep water port; Beihai plans to process minerals for export by rail to the Port of Fanchong
100 kilometers to the west; Yantai plans ports, fish processing, textiles, and light industry. Id.
239. Id. Shanghai ranked first in output among Chinese cities in 1984. Asian Wall St. J.
Weekly, supra note 229, at 13, col. 2. Although not designated an SEZ, Beijing's international
status and access to high level approvals provide many of the benefits of an SEZ.
240. Firms Must Hunt Hard and Pay Big Bucks for Offices in Being, Bus. ASIA, Aug. 17,
1984, at 260- 61.
241. Id.
242. Comment, supra note 25, at 379 (comparing a ratio of one phone to 1.4 people in the
U.S.). Id.
243. See, e.g., Kraar, supra note 94, at 121 (Pepsi bottling plant output faces a 19-mile
truck journey through shifting mud whenever it rains). See also Wall St. J., supra note 110, at
34, col. 3. (Shanghai-Foxboro joint venture on traffic jammed mud road).
244. Comment, supra note 25, at 379. E.g., plans to convert part of the port facility in
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Energy sources for both production and transport are scarce. Rich
coal deposits lie deep in the inland provinces.245 China's efforts to tap its
oil resources have fallen short of expectations.246 The present oil supply
is inadequate to support expansion of highway transport. 247 In October
1984 the Government reported that twenty percent of the country's ma-
chinery stood idle because of energy shortages.248 The shortages were
most serious in Shanghai, China's biggest industrial center, and in nine
eastern provinces, including many SEZ port cities.249
The most advantageous site for a joint venture pairs the best physi-
cal conditions with the most capable and reliable partner available. That
partner may already have reliable supply sources for closely related pro-
duction and the ability to identify means for exporting new products.
Such a partner may enable the joint venture to give first priority to Chi-
nese producers as supply sources, as law requires.
VII. OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT
The Joint Venture Labor Regulations require that one of the inves-
tors serve as general manager. 250 The requirement, however, is appar-
ently not enforced if a salaried manager appears capable. Often, the
existing staff supplies a factory manager, who may be an expatriate Chi-
nese returning to China by government invitation. In the joint venture
luxury hotels, managers are normally salaried Europeans.251
One of the joint venture board's foremost tasks is the choice of a
manager and the delegation of responsibility. The contract may include
guidelines for selection and performance evaluation. Chinese managers
require training in technical, budgetary, and personnel skills, while for-
eign managers may lack insight into Chinese customs and problems.
252
Tianjin SEZ to a containerized shipping terminal cannot benefit surrounding areas because the
highways and truck terminals are inadequate to handle a complementary volume. Id. at 379
(citing Suprowicz, DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, at 72 (1978)).
245. Comment, supra note 25, at 379.
246. Wall St. J. supra note 152, at 1, 27.
247. Id.
248. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Nov. 11, 1984 at 12, col. 3.
249. Id. Because of haphazard state allocations, poor transport, and erratic production,
availability of supplies is uncertain. E.g., while circuit boards are readily available, a small
screw may be unavailable. Wall St. J., April 25, 1985, at 34, col. 4. Supply of workers is
equally unpredictable. Id.
250. Joint Venture Labor Regulations art. 6.
251. E.g., managers in the large hotels clearly have no substantial financial interests in
those ventures. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan. 14, 1985, at 17. One of the partners may
select the management. See, e.g., U.S. Firm's Deal, supra note 146, at 89 (OMI electroplating).
252. See Arnold, supra note 97, at 173.
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If the industry calls for foreign management, individuals with a back-
ground of international contacts may handle the cross-cultural problems
best. A survey of major hotels reveals operations managers are very
often Europeans from the smaller nations of Belgium, England, and
Switzerland.253
A. Personnel Management
Personnel management presents a complex problem in financial
management and psychology for the contract negotiator and the opera-
tions manager. The Chinese acknowledge their lack of management
skills and plan to solve pervasive management problems using Western
techniques.254 China's productivity suffers from its tradition of iron-clad
job security, exacerbated today by chronic overstaffing aimed at alleviat-
ing unemployment.255 Most of the available workers are entirely un-
skilled in modern production techniques.2 56 Wages remain low, despite
increases from recent government orders and the twenty to fifty percent
surcharge joint ventures must pay.2 57 Workers receive less than one-
fourth of the surcharge, the balance going to the Government.258 As a
result of such difficult, static conditions, worker output is low, morale is
poor, and absenteeism is high.259
An investor and manager can anticipate these problems at the ven-
ture's negotiation stages. The joint venture labor contract must address
employment and dismissal rights.2 ° The investor should bargain for the
right to set aptitude standards by defining the extent of training the ven-
ture will provide. Costs of these training obligations justify limiting the
amount of excess staff the venture will be pressed to accept.26' Labor
regulations allow dismissal of workers who fail at training or "surplus"
workers.2 62 The contract should reserve the right to fire unproductive
workers by defining these terms. The standard for a successfully trained
253. What to Watch, supra note 112, at 299.
254. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 168, at 17.
255. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 85.
256. See Arnold, supra note 97, at 173.
257. See Export License Labyrinth: A Chinese Puzzle for High Tech Sales to PRC, supra
note 29, at 386.
258. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 79. Chinese wages equal 50-75% of pay
scales in developed countries. See Comment, supra note 25, at 374.
259. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at 6, col. 2.
260. Joint Venture Labor Regulations art. 3.
261. What to Watch, supra note 112, at 299.
262. Joint Venture Labor Regulations art. 11.
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worker should require a cooperative attitude, allowing managers to fire
those workers with chronic morale problems.
Despite such precautions, investors find their control of personnel
extremely limited.263 As a result, most personnel management problems
involve long-term morale and staff development issues. A Western man-
ager should avoid confusion and dissatisfaction by adopting Chinese
work patterns to the extent that they do not impede production.
In most Chinese factories, workers put in a twelve-hour day between
8:00 A.M. and 8:00 P.M. A large midday meal with a two hour rest
break begins around noon. Workers with families in other provinces re-
turn home for approximately a month, either by rotating duty, or by
plant closure.264 An annual leave remains especially appropriate for
skilled workers who leave their provinces and families to work on a joint
venture project.
The joint venture must provide other benefits similar to those the
Government provides all workers. 265 The Joint Venture Labor Regula-
tions require payment of labor insurance, medical expenses, and addi-
tional subsidies.266  The Government normally provides day care,
education benefits, retirement pay, and generous support during preg-
nancy or disability. The type and extent of benefits offered by the ven-
ture are negotiable and may be negotiated to yield maximum worker
satisfaction at reasonable cost.
The problems of worker morale may be addressed in a number of
ways. The training mentioned above may boost worker self-esteem. 267
The venture may also be permitted to offer bonus payments, which
clearly motivate Chinese workers.268 In rural economic experiments,
farm workers produced record crops to earn "bonus" income from sales
in the free markets.2 69 The Government's short-lived bonus program fell
prey to corruption that the joint venture may succeed in avoiding.
Bonus payments should be tied to the venture's location and re-
sources. One joint venture pays ten percent of wages in foreign ex-
change, so workers can buy goods in the well-stocked foreign exchange
263. Wall St. J., supra note 1, at 1.
264. See Kraar, supra note 101, at 124, 128.
265. Joint Venture Labor Regulations art. 9.
266. Id.
267. Comment, supra note 25, at 376.
268. See, e.g., How High Tech Firms Plan to Service Products in China, supra note 199, at
386.
269. Reeder, supra note 15, at 75-76.
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shops.2 70 Bonuses in venture stock have not yet been approved, but may
be in the future.
The joint venture structure benefits by creating an environment that
satisfies the Chinese workers' emphasis on group identification. To guide
planning toward that end, an investor should consider the trend toward
the work group identification in the West.271 Innovative businesses have
attempted to increase productivity by using "quality circles" of cowork-
ers who practice mutual, corrective criticism. 72 The Chinese fervor for
group identity inhibits individual innovation. Workers generally avoid
distinguishing themselves by innovative suggestion or unusual achieve-
ment. 73 Careful blending of Chinese and Western management styles
has the potential to maximize productivity.
274
A final personnel issue involves arrangements for Western workers
employed in China. These workers require housing, food, education, and
medical services far superior to those available to Chinese workers. Typ-
ical Chinese urban housing is quite cramped and many units lack bathing
facilities .2 7  Furthermore, the Government may limit utilities, including
heat.276 Generally, the Chinese Government prefers to segregate West-
ern visitors and has identified communities for their use. This segrega-
tion tends to reduce comparisons between Chinese and visitors' living
conditions. However, a conspicuously privileged foreign class may evoke
Chinese memories of domination.2 77 An investor who is aware of the
tension created by such problems should be better able to assess available
housing.
B. Accounting
The tax regulations include basic formulas for computing taxable
income, specific allowable deductions, depreciation of fixed assets, calen-
dar year, and accounting methods.278 These regulations are supple-
mented by the Accounting Regulations of the People's Republic of China
270. Id. The free market has goods that the Chinese could not get two years ago, but most
sought-after Western products still sell only in foreign exchange outlets.
271. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. Bonuses, wages, honorable titles, skill,
and promotion tend to motivate workers, in that order. Nevis, supra note 75, at 23.
272. Forum-The Productivity Challenge: A Far Broader Approach is Necessary, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 17, 1985, at F3, col. I.
273. See Arnold, supra note 97, at 173; Wall St. J., supra note 107, at 34, col. 4.
274. Id.
275. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 92.
276. Beijing customarily saves fuel by cutting off residential heating on March 15, although
temperatures may drop to 40 degrees in April. Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1985 at 27, col. 5.
277. Id.
278. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 92.
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for Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, which became
effective July 1, 1985.279 The rules generally follow international ac-
counting practices, with some unusual rules and limitations.280 The joint
venture must keep all accounting records in the Chinese language to al-
low audit by tax authorities.281 It must keep a standard balance sheet,
income statements, and a statement of changes in financial position.282
Infractions may be prosecuted in the People's Economic Courts.
283
Although China has a shortage of certified public accountants, for-
eign accountants cannot formally register. The foreign partner may,
however, conduct an independent audit at its own expense, and may have
a foreign accountant participate in a joint audit.
284
The Chinese concept of accounting is evolving slowly toward the
Western concept. Many issues, including adjustments for multiple taxa-
tion, or strategies for passing the tax burden on to consumers in the
nonmarket economy, are not yet resolved.285 A joint venture negotiator
loses nothing by structuring accounting in order to take advantage of the
many ambiguities, but should remember that China still views business
as a source of government revenues.286
C. Quality Control
Theoretically, the joint venture's Chinese workers should be able to
produce consistently high quality goods in most industries. Chinese pur-
chasers require strict quality assurances and opportunities to inspect in-
coming goods.287 However, buyers have found that even premium goods
are uneven in quality. To some extent nonindustrial Chinese culture
lacks rigorous standards of uniformity typical of Western industrial pro-
duction methods. For example, a recent edition of the Beijing Economic
newspaper contained many errors, including the date of publication.288
Other causes of poor quality may be managed, however. Worker
indifference may be minimized by methods discussed above.289 Inferior
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. New Chinese Rules Set Accounting Standards for Joint Ventures, Bus. AsIA, July 19,
1985, at 231 [hereinafter New Chinese Rules].
282. See id. See also Comment, supra note 25, at 364-68.
283. New Chinese Rules, supra note 281, at 231.
284. See Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 74-77.
285. New Chinese Rules, supra note 281, at 231.
286. Id.; Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 88
287. Comment, supra note 25, at 368.
288. Alford & Birenbaum, supra note 4, at 85.
289. See Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 38, col. 1.
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equipment and outmoded production techniques may be replaced by
modem technology. Perhaps most importantly, personnel training can
explain the product's function so the worker can recognize adequate and
superior quality.
Foreign managers report that Chinese workers are very willing to
comply with a positive model.2 90 The contract might require that the
product match its Western counterpart in every significant detail,
achieved by using methods and objective specifications observed in ex-
isting Chinese productions. Such positive contract provisions for pro-
duction modification may provide the groundwork for cooperation and
avoid resentment and blame over unmarketable early products.
D. Marketing, Pricing, and Advertising
Most investors who choose China rather than another undeveloped
country want a share of the world's largest consumer market. 291 Altering
early policies to attract investors, the Government now allows joint ven-
turers to negotiate for access to domestic markets.292 Investors complain,
however, that such promises of market access remain unfulfilled.293 Pro-
ducers find they cannot sell the negotiated percentage of their products
because trading associations refuse to buy, 294 probably on government
instruction. The Government is most likely to permit joint ventures to
sell high technology or other short supply items.295 To locate a ready
market, a joint venture entity should plan sales of improved products to
customers who were formerly served by its Chinese partner.296
The pricing of joint venture products presents special problems at a
time when the Government is attempting to deregulate prices after de-
cades of stringent controls. Dramatic price increases are keyed to wage
increases.297 To cope with rapidly changing conditions the joint venture
should reserve the right to set domestic market prices according to sup-
290. See supra notes 261-72 and accompanying text.
291. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 251, at 16, col. 3.
292. See Comment, supra note 25, at 381; supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
293. Until 1982, the China Government required that exports of joint venture goods must
match any domestic sales, and otherwise strictly limited access to domestic markets. Fewer
than 50 investors formed joint ventures. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col.
2.
294. Wall St. J., supra note 1, at 30, col. 2; Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Oct. 15, 1984, at 15,
col. 2.
295. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 115, at 24, col. 2.
296. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 94, at 6, col. 3.
297. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1985, at 34, col. 3.
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ply and labor costs. Formulas used to set prices on the world market
may serve as a model.
Aside from securing an opportunity to sell and setting a reasonable
price, few ventures have actively promoted their products. Advertising is
rare in China, since state-owned enterprises have no cause to offer incen-
tives to consumers to buy their scarce commodities. One Western firm
has used billboard messages to encourage readers to buy out of provincial
loyalty, a strong Chinese tradition.298 Several joint ventures are now ana-
lyzing the Chinese market for other advertising and marketing
techniques.299
The advent of Western television in China promises that advertising
will soon be commonplace. A study of government slogan campaigns
might suggest strategies for use there. Commercial slogans may be
geared to the unusual Chinese market characteristics: the average age,
twenty-six, is the youngest in the world, and half the Chinese population
is under twenty.3 °
The joint venture is free to market its products outside China.301
Planning for world markets primarily involves problems in quality con-
trol and transportation.30 2 The foreign partner can avoid competing with
its own subsidiaries outside China by specifying in the contract that its
Chinese products must be sold on other, noncompeting markets.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Investors have difficulty deciding whether to take advantage of their
China venture possibilities. According to government objectives, China's
peasant society will embrace consumerism and light industry within five
to fifteen years. Undeniably, the transition has begun, and a consumer
lifestyle compatible with Chinese traditions is developing. Yet, the more
the economy changes, the more closely tied to its traditional values
China seems to become. These values have never encompassed capital-
ism and may ultimately hamper China's enthusiasm for business as
Western investors would like to see it conducted.
The economic indicators delivered confusing messages. In 1985
298. See Wall St. J., supra note 134, at 34, col. 1; Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 229,
at 12, col. 1.
299. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 25, at 381-82.
300. CBS recently began television advertising in China for IBM, Boeing, Kodak, Proctor
and Gamble, and Weyerhauser. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan. 28, 1985, at 20, col. 4. See also
Comment, supra note 25, at 381.
301. Joint Venture Labor Regulations art. 9.
302. See supra notes 248-67 and accompanying text.
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China experienced soaring inflation, high trade deficits, and depleted for-
eign exchange reserves, 30 3 contrasting with a remarkable growth rate in
the private sector for both light and heavy industry.3" The figures sug-
gest strong continued support for private industry, but hint of tighter
foreign trade controls.305 The Seventh Five-Year Plan for 1986-1990
projects an overall seven percent growth rate.3°6 Price deregulation may
be the most immediately vulnerable point. Though the Government pre-
vented hardships by raising salaries before raising prices, it could not
prevent consumers from anticipating price increases. Consumers in each
city emptied market shelves on the final day of the old price structure.
Under the new structure, prices rose an average of more than fifty
percent.30 7
Political reshuffling under Deng's control makes sudden policy re-
versals less likely than those experienced in the past.30 8 Deng's proteg6s,
Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, probably have enough power and exper-
tise to maintain a reasonably successful policy as a growing number of
ministries come under the authority of reform supporters.3 °9
Indicators of new lifestyles reach the press almost daily, and reform
becomes more difficult to reverse as its effects become complex and per-
vasive. Chinese workers have begun to think enthusiastically of their
consumer power,310 and the government has permitted credit sales for
the first time since 1949 to encourage purchasing. 31" A new market in
ideas and art has gained vitality. China Central Television brings audi-
ences carefully chosen Western presentations.312 The Government now
303. PRC Economic Reforms, supra note 12, at 129-30.
304. PRC Economic Data Reveal Boom Conditions as Well as Dismal Trends, Bus. AsIA,
March 24, 1986, at 89.
305. China in 1985 Records Huge Trade Deficit, Healthy Output Growth, Bus. ASIA, Jan.
27, 1986, at 307.
306. Id.
307. See, eg., WALL ST. J., May 10, 1985, at 29. col. 1; Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra
note 22.
308. China's Party Conference, supra note 45, at 308.
309. See id. at 307-08. However, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade
recentralized control of steel, chemical fertilizer, grain, and sugar, and Beijing central govern-
ment reclaimed control of crude oil, coke, grain, and cotton, because "incompetent and redun-
dant" local authorities concluded disadvantageous deals. The SEZs retained their delegated
authority. Id. at 130.
310. Retail sales rose 17.4% in 1985. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Jan. 28, 1985, at 20, col. 2.
E.g., the Chinese now want to acquire color television sets. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, Feb. 18,
1985, at 12, col. 4. High-heeled boots are fashionable and counterfeit Western blue jeans have
replaced drab uniforms. Id.
311. Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 300, at 20, col. 4.
312. Id. The Chinese chose "Muggable Mary," a cancelled network series about a woman
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even permits Western music and dancing as part of quasi-political holi-
day celebrations.313 Christian evangelist Billy Graham accepted China's
invitation for a 1986 tour of fourteen universities.314 In a revitalization
of arts and ideas, the Government has permitted performances of tradi-
tional opera,315 and has encouraged some literary innovation.316
Although China's crippling lack of industrial infrastructure pres-
ently shows little improvement, specific areas are developing to meet the
need of particular industries. The new Five-Year Plan narrows these
preferred industries to include energy, transport, telecommunications,
and industrial raw materials. Power generation capacity is planned to
increase forty-seven percent in five years, and freight transport capacity
thirty percent.317
China continues to attract Westerners as would-be investors. Some
never complete negotiations, some lose their initial investments31 8 and
leave frustrated and angry.319 All Western investors discover unantici-
pated problems. 320 Those who apparently succeed have adopted an opti-
mistic attitude drawing on the spirit of China itself.321  In sum, China is
poor, underdeveloped, plagued with shifting priorities, and inexperienced
in business. It is most certainly not Westernized and, despite its new
trappings, will remain steeped in its cultural heritage. But with extensive
planning and great patience, it may prove a richly rewarding arena for
investment.
police decoy; "Quarterback Princess" a TV movie about a girl who tries out for a high school
football team; and some football games. Id.
313. See Miami Herald, May 2, 1985, at 22A, col. 1.
314. Miami Herald, Feb. 14, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
315. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 229, at 12, col. 4.
316. Salisbury, On the Literary Road: American Writers in China, N.Y. Times Book Re-
view, Jan. 20, 1985, at 3. Chinese writers were brutally suppressed during the Cultural
Revolution. Id.
317. China's Party Conference, supra note 45, at 308.
318. See, e.g., Electronics Joint Venture, supra note 104, at 68 (Clark Copiers joint venture
underfunded and stalled).
319. See, e.g., Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 20, at 2, col. 1 (Australian hat manufac-
turing joint venture ends in bitter recriminations by each partner).
320. See, e.g., Wall St. J., supra note 107, at 34, col. 2.
321. See Asian Wall St. J. Weekly, supra note 189, col. 1.
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